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INTRODUCTION 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property begins with a 
startling characterization of the business world of the 1930s: “Grown to 
tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a ‘corporate 
system’—as there was once a feudal system.”1 Berle and Means argued 
that the emergence of this system had fundamentally transformed the role 
of the corporation in society, and that corporations had become so large 
and influential that their behavior impacted “the life of the country and . . . 
every individual.”2 Yet their enormous scale meant that they were financed 
by “the wealth of innumerable individuals,” nearly all of whom had 
become completely passive investors with no role in their governance: 
ownership was separated from control.3 To Berle and Means this meant 
that traditional concepts of the corporation were no longer adequate. A 
new concept of the corporation was needed—a concept that might imply 
that the interests of the community ought to be incorporated into corporate 
conduct. 
The arguments framing The Modern Corporation are quite 
historically specific. The book claims that the rapid growth of large 
businesses over the decades preceding its publication had produced 
something “beyond the imagination of most statesmen and businessmen at 
the opening of the present century.”4 It also draws contrasts between the 
corporate system of the 1930s and corporations from earlier eras. The 
reader is told, for example, that ownership and control were unified within 
nineteenth century corporations, and that large quasi-public firms with 
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thousands of shareholders gradually began to displace smaller enterprises 
and dominate many sectors of the economy over time. 
Yet in spite of the importance of history in The Modern Corporation, 
the book presents only a cursory sketch of the historical processes that led 
to the emergence of the corporate system and no clear account of the 
timing of developments such as the separation of ownership from control 
among major corporations.5 In part, this reflects the difficulty of 
researching the early history of the American corporation and the paucity 
of surviving business records from the nineteenth century. But it also may 
reflect the intuitive notion that the major corporations of the 1930s were 
so much larger and so different from early business enterprises that it was 
hardly necessary to document the differences in detail. That the rise of the 
corporate system and the separation of ownership from control were recent 
developments likely seemed obvious. Much of the subsequent literature 
on the evolution of the corporate form accepted the historical claims of 
Berle and Means.6 
Yet the evolution of the American business corporation was more 
complex and varied than this intuitive characterization would imply. Many 
corporations chartered in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
were in fact quite large, and the lists of their initial subscribers sometimes 
included more than a thousand names.7 By the early nineteenth century, 
securities exchanges had opened in several American cities, facilitating 
trade in the stock of many of those enterprises and helping to diffuse the 
shares among larger numbers of investors.8 And there is evidence that 
problems related to what Berle and Means called the “divergence of 
interest between ownership and control” were present as well.9 For 
example, the history of American railroads includes scandalous episodes 
of insiders enriching themselves at the expense of the other securities 
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holders.10 And the shareholders of mid-nineteenth century manufacturing 
corporations complained that the directors of those enterprises engaged in 
self-dealing and manipulated proxy voting to entrench themselves in their 
positions.11 The corporations of the 1930s were different from those of 
earlier eras, but it is not clear whether those differences were consistent 
with the claims of Berle and Means. 
This Article presents new evidence on the evolution of the business 
corporation in America and on the emergence of what is commonly termed 
the “Berle and Means corporation.” Drawing on a wide range of sources, 
I investigate three major historical claims of The Modern Corporation: 
that large corporations had displaced small ones by the early twentieth 
century; that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were much larger 
than the public corporations of the nineteenth century; and that ownership 
was separated from control to a much greater extent in the 1930s compared 
to the nineteenth century. I address each of these claims with new data and 
present analyses of nineteenth century corporations that mirror Berle and 
Means’s analysis of the corporations of the 1930s. The conclusions I draw 
from these analyses revise the historical claims of The Modern 
Corporation in important ways. 
To determine whether large corporations displaced small enterprises, 
I document changes in the total number of business corporations in the 
United States over time. If large corporations had indeed taken the place 
of small ones by the 1930s, then the total number of business corporations 
should have fallen. Next, I investigate whether the large enterprises 
chronicled in The Modern Corporation were in fact larger than the public 
companies of the nineteenth century by documenting the scale of public 
companies sampled from different points in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Finally, I analyze the ownership structure of public 
companies from the 1820s, 1870s, and 1930s to investigate whether there 
were changes in the degree to which ownership was separated from control 
over time. 
The first conclusion I reach is that large corporations did not displace 
small corporations, as Berle and Means claimed. The early twentieth 
century in fact witnessed a flourishing of the small business corporation, 
as reflected in rapid growth in the total number of corporations. The huge 
manufacturing firms and utilities that are the focus of The Modern 
Corporation apparently coexisted with large and growing numbers of very 
small corporations, rather than displacing them. 
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On the other hand, consistent with the argument of the book, I find 
that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were indeed significantly 
larger than their predecessors from either the nineteenth century or the 
earlier decades of the twentieth century, both in absolute terms and relative 
to average incomes. Berle and Means were correct in their judgment that 
the largest businesses of their time had achieved a scale that was 
historically unprecedented. 
But even though they were larger than their predecessors from earlier 
eras, it does not necessarily follow that ownership was separated from 
control within those enterprises to a greater extent. Berle and Means 
clearly argue that the “surrender of control” among investors that resulted 
from the diffusion of shareholding was a “new aspect” of the corporation 
in their time.12 Yet direct comparisons between the ownership structures 
of the 200 corporations chronicled in their book with those of public 
companies from earlier eras reveal that the separation of ownership from 
control was not a modern phenomenon. In fact, ownership was separated 
from control to a lesser extent among the 1930s corporations studied by 
Berle and Means than among the public companies of the 1870s and even 
the 1820s. In some important respects, the Berle and Means corporation 
emerged well before Berle and Means claimed it did. 
One implication of this finding is that the problems and 
contradictions Berle and Means identified as consequences of the 
separation of ownership from control were likely much more common 
throughout the history of the corporation in America than their book 
suggests. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of 
corporations whose enormous scale was historically unprecedented. Yet 
public companies with relatively large numbers of investors and little if 
any concentrated shareholding were present from at least the early 
nineteenth century. It is likely that there was never a period in which 
ownership and control were unified, at least among publicly traded 
companies. 
Another implication of this finding is that the arguments for a new 
conception of the corporation presented in The Modern Corporation apply 
to public companies of all eras, past and future, rather than just the big 
businesses of the 1930s. If we accept that the separation of ownership from 
control transforms the property relationships embodied by the corporation 
and the range of interests that should be considered in governing corporate 
conduct, then the questions raised by The Modern Corporation are not 
historically specific and are relevant to the general concept of the public 
corporation. 
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I. BERLE AND MEANS ON NINETEENTH CENTURY CORPORATE HISTORY 
The Modern Corporation does not present a full history of the 
American business corporation. Instead, several chapters begin with 
descriptions of early corporations and present a sketch of how they 
changed over time to contrast the modern corporate system with historical 
enterprise and place the book’s characterizations of modern corporations 
in historical context. 
The first chapter of the book presents a description of the rise of what 
is termed the corporate system, which includes a brief discussion of its 
nineteenth century beginnings. Berle and Means characterize nineteenth 
century corporations as small enterprises in which ownership and control 
were unified: “The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by 
individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and 
was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals 
in control.”13 
Berle and Means further elaborate on this characterization, arguing 
that the agents to whom management was delegated were carefully 
monitored by the owners who possessed strong rights of control: 
We have the picture of a group of owners, necessarily delegating 
certain powers of management, protected in their property rights by 
a series of fixed rules under which the management had a relatively 
limited play. The management of the corporation indeed was thought 
of as a set of agents running a business for a set of owners; and while 
they could and did have wider powers than most agents, they were 
strictly accountable and were in a position to be governed in all 
matters of general policy by their owners.14 
It is important to note that some of the language surrounding these 
passages suggests an acknowledgement that there could have been 
exceptions to these generalizations; their description of a “typical 
business” might allow for atypical businesses with other characteristics. 
Indeed, Berle and Means concede that some large corporations emerged 
in the early nineteenth century in textile manufacturing in New England 
and the significant scale and diffuse ownership of mid-nineteenth century 
railroads. But particularly for the early nineteenth century, they argue that, 
in general, ownership was not separated from control: “The number of 
shareholders was few; they could and did attend meetings; they were 
business-men; their vote meant something.”15 
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Although they do not provide a clear account of the timing of the 
transition, Berle and Means argue that large corporations began to emerge 
later. The new enterprises displaced the old, smaller ones, creating a new 
corporate system: 
These units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great 
aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of 
workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, 
belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are 
combined through the corporate mechanism.16 
Berle and Means argue that those great aggregations achieved a scale 
that was historically unprecedented and obtained control over an ever-
growing share of economic activity. Economic and political power were 
concentrated to a great extent within a relatively small number of giant 
corporations. 
And control of those corporations was, in turn, held by a relatively 
small number of people. Many of the new enterprises had tens or even 
hundreds of thousands of shareholders who were completely passive. This 
fundamentally changed the traditional conception of property rights 
associated with stock ownership and severed the connection between 
corporate ownership and control: 
The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far 
surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has 
exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he 
may become merely recipient of the wages of capital. 
. . . . 
 The corporate system appears only when [the] private or “close” 
corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasi-
public corporation: a corporation in which a large measure of 
separation of ownership from control has taken place . . . .17 
In fact, even the stockholder’s claim on the wages of capital may be 
lost, as controlling insiders—either the managers or minority owners—
may use their powers to enrich themselves at the expense of the other 
securities holders: 
If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime 
force motivating control, we must conclude that the interests of 
control are different from and often radically opposed to those of 
ownership; that the owners most emphatically will not be served by 
a profit-seeking controlling group. In the operation of the 
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corporation, the controlling group even if they own a large block of 
stock, can serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense 
of the company than by making profits for it.18 
But the implications of these historical developments were much 
broader to Berle and Means than simple conflicts of interest between the 
shareholders and corporate insiders. The transformation of the economy 
from one in which production took place within small enterprises operated 
by owner-managers to one completely dominated by a handful of large 
corporations controlled by managers who were not significant owners, nor 
accountable to the owners, constituted a fundamental change. This change 
“destroy[ed] the basis of the old assumption that the quest for profits will 
spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use,” and 
consequently “destroy[ed] the very foundation on which the economic 
order of the past three centuries has rested.”19 Berle and Means concluded 
that a new concept of the corporation that could account for these changes 
was needed. 
II. HISTORICAL CLAIMS OF BERLE AND MEANS: NEW EVIDENCE 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, The Modern Corporation 
presents a brief account of the rise of a new corporate system. This 
corporate system, as described in the book, was the product of three 
developments: (A) the displacement of small firms by large corporations; 
(B) the growth in the scale of quasi-public corporations; and (C) the 
separation of ownership from control as a result of the growth in corporate 
scale. In what follows, I introduce new historical evidence regarding each 
of these claims and analyze how well they characterize the historical 
evolution of the American business corporation. I present a cursory 
description of some of the sources and methods used in the analysis in the 
text; more complete documentation is presented in the Appendix at the end 
of this Article. 
A. Displacement of Small Corporations 
The Modern Corporation establishes clearly that in the 1930s, large 
quasi-public companies accounted for a substantial fraction of economic 
activity and dominated many sectors of the economy. But the book’s 
account of the rise of the corporate system describes the new aggregations 
as “supplanting” smaller corporations, or older private companies “giving 
way” to newer public ones.20 In order to evaluate this claim, and to gain a 
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sense of how broadly applicable the claims of The Modern Corporation 
are to the governance of corporations generally, it is necessary to trace out 
the history of the number of business corporations in the United States. If 
large enterprises displaced small ones, then one should expect to observe 
a reduction in the number of small corporations and therefore in the total 
number of corporations. 
Unfortunately, comprehensive data on the number of business 
corporations in the United States does not exist for the years prior to the 
Revenue Act of 1916, which created the modern income tax system and 
corporate income tax.21 However, some American states, particularly 
those with large numbers of business corporations, collected detailed 
records of operating corporations as part of their systems for the collection 
of corporate taxes.22 These states’ records of their own business 
corporations provide suggestive evidence for the early evolution of the use 
of the corporate form. Beginning in the 1870s, Massachusetts, a state in 
which the corporate form found very heavy use, began to collect and 
publish detailed data on its corporations. New York, another prolific 
creator of early corporations, established capital taxes in earlier periods 
that resulted in the collection of records of its corporations. A rough 
account of the evolution of the number of American business corporations 
can therefore be constructed from comprehensive federal data for the years 
following 1916, from Massachusetts data for 1870–1916, and from New 
York data, which are available for some years prior to 1870. To account 
for the fact that the economy and population grew considerably over time, 
the total number of corporations will be scaled by the total population of 
the United States, or of the relevant state, from the same year, as obtained 
from the federal census. 
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2019] Historical Perspective 425 
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
New York State
Massachusetts
United States (IRS)
C
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 p
er
 M
ill
io
n 
P
er
so
ns
 
Figure 1: Corporations Per Million Persons, 1820–1930 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the number of corporations per million persons 
from 1918–1930 for the United States, from 1870–1910 for 
Massachusetts (with data presented at five-year intervals), and from 
1826 and 1868 for New York. All population data are from the 
decennial census, linearly interpolated. Data for the states are scaled 
by those states’ populations. The sources and methods used to 
produce the figure are presented in the Appendix. 
Figure 1 presents these data graphically. The point farthest to the 
right is for 1930, the year of much of the corporate ownership data 
presented in The Modern Corporation. In that year, there were about 
519,000 business corporations in the United States; scaling this number by 
the total population (about 123.2 million people) results in a ratio of about 
4,200 corporations per million people. This number was likely the highest 
in the world and shows that American businesses were quite unusual in 
426 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:417 
their propensity to utilize the corporate form, particularly among small 
enterprises.23 
Moving backward in time, the data for the United States shows rapid 
growth over the previous twelve years (1918–1930). When we turn to the 
period 1870–1910, for which we have data for Massachusetts (scaled by 
its population), the pattern of rapid growth in the use of the corporate form 
continues back to the year 1900 or so, which represents something of an 
inflection point. For the years 1870–1900, growth in the use of the 
corporate form was far slower. Then, for the early nineteenth century, the 
New York data shows less frequent use of the corporate form and slower 
growth in its use. Since the use of the corporate form in New York in the 
early twentieth century was generally consistent with that of the nation as 
a whole, the years after 1868 must have seen tremendous growth in the 
number of corporations in New York.24 
An obvious question that arises regarding these data is the 
representativeness of the states of Massachusetts and New York. In fact, 
those states were among the most prolific creators of business corporations 
in the early nineteenth century.25 This implies that the figure likely 
overstates the number of corporations for the nineteenth century compared 
to the nation as a whole, from which it follows that the growth in the 
number of corporations in the years of the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth century must have been even more rapid for the nation as a 
whole. 
We can conclude from these data that in contrast to the claim that 
small corporations were somehow displaced or made irrelevant by the rise 
of big business, the number of small businesses grew quite rapidly in the 
early twentieth century—the rise of the large corporations at the heart of 
the book was in fact accompanied by a flourishing of small private 
companies. The corporate system chronicled by Berle and Means 
apparently co-existed with other corporate systems of smaller and much 
more numerous corporations. 
                                                     
 23. Leslie Hannah, A Global Corporate Census: Publicly Traded and Close Companies in 1910, 
68 ECON. HIST. REV. 548, 553 (2015) (describing how in 1910, the only year for which such evidence 
has been compiled, corporations in the United States accounted for 59% of total worldwide 
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 24. See infra app. at Table 1. 
 25. See, e.g., Eric Hilt, Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing 
Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, in ENTERPRISING AMERICA: BUSINESS, BANKS 
AND CREDIT MARKETS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 73, 78 (William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo 
eds., 2015) (showing that the number of charters granted to business corporations in early nineteenth 
century Massachusetts was larger than the average for the United States); Eric Hilt, Early American 
Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 48 (Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (showing that the number of charters granted to business 
corporations in early nineteenth century New York was larger than the average for the United States). 
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B. Growth in the Scale of Quasi-Public Corporations 
We turn now to an analysis of how the scale of quasi-public 
companies evolved over time. Much of the analysis of The Modern 
Corporation is devoted to documenting the ownership of the 200 largest 
American corporations in 1930. The ideal way to investigate changes in 
the size of quasi-public companies would be to compile data on the 200 
largest American businesses in earlier time periods and document the 
changes in their average size. Unfortunately, insufficient records exist for 
nineteenth century corporations to compile such data. Instead, I begin by 
analyzing the size of the very largest corporation in existence in the United 
States at various points in time, which can be determined with a reasonable 
degree of confidence. Focusing on the single largest company may not 
reveal much about the typical quasi-public company, but it does provide a 
rough sense of the scale that large corporations had achieved. I then 
analyze samples of publicly traded companies from different historical 
time periods. These firms are quite representative of the public 
corporations of their eras but may not be directly comparable to Berle and 
Means’s sample for the 1930s, which consists of the 200 largest 
corporations, irrespective of whether they were publicly traded. 
To make the relative sizes of different business corporations 
comparable over time, I scale the value of their assets by the 
contemporaneous value of national income per capita. For example, if a 
business had $1 million in assets in 1840, and income per person in 1840 
were $100, then the ratio of the two would be 10,000. This would imply 
that the total value of the assets of that business was 10,000 times that of 
average annual income, or put another way, it would take the incomes of 
10,000 average individuals to purchase all the assets of the business. This 
ratio therefore has a natural connection to the degree of diffusion of 
ownership one would expect to see. And as both values are obtained at the 
same point in time, calculating their ratio requires no adjustment for 
changes in the price level. 
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Figure 2: Scale of the Largest Existing Corporation in the  
United States: Total Assets/GDP Per Capita, in Millions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the changes in the scale of the largest existing 
business corporation in the United States, measured as total assets 
relative to GDP per capita. For example, the second point from the 
left, the Second Bank of the United States in 1831, is 1.3 million, 
meaning that the value of its total assets at that time ($112.7 million) 
was equivalent to 1.3 million times the value of GDP per capita in the 
United States at that time, which was $86. For sources and data, see 
the Appendix. 
Figure 2 presents the ratio of the total assets of the largest business 
in the United States to nominal income at various points in time. The seven 
corporations that reached the status of largest in the country are the First 
Bank of the United States (total assets observed in 1801), the Second Bank 
of the United States (1831), the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (1855), the 
Pennsylvania Railroad (1872), the Union Pacific Railroad (1888), U.S. 
Steel (1902), and AT&T (1930). The data in the figure exhibit a dramatic 
increase in the twentieth century, with U.S. Steel’s assets of $1.5 billion 
being equivalent to more than 5.5 million times income per capita in 1902, 
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and AT&T’s assets being equivalent to nearly 9 million times income per 
capita in 1932. Consistent with the argument of Berle and Means, the 
largest public companies had achieved a scale that was historically 
unprecedented in the early twentieth century. The growth in the scale of 
the largest enterprises far surpassed the growth of income per person.  
It is worth noting that the Second Bank of the United States, with 
total assets of more than $100 million, was quite large by any standard, 
and in fact more than 1 million times the value of income per capita during 
its era. Seen in this context, the political controversies surrounding that 
institution are not surprising. But this suggests that Figure 2 likely 
understates the contrast between twentieth century corporations and their 
predecessors in the early nineteenth century. Whereas there were many 
large firms that nearly rivaled U.S. Steel and AT&T in size in the twentieth 
century, the second and third-largest corporations in existence in the early 
nineteenth century were likely orders of magnitude smaller than the First 
and Second Banks of the United States, which were highly unusual 
enterprises. 
A broader set of comparisons can be made using samples of public 
companies. Here I focus on public companies from contexts in which 
ownership records are available from archival sources. These include 
companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock & Exchange 
Board (the predecessor to the NYSE) in 1825–1826, the corporations 
traded on the Boston Stock Exchange in 1872, NYSE-listed corporations 
from 1901, and the Berle and Means sample of the 200 largest corporations 
in 1930. 
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Figure 3: Scale of Publicly Traded Corporations in the  
United States: Total Assets/GDP Per Capita, in Millions (Log Scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the changes in the scale of publicly traded 
corporations in the United States. The numbers plotted in the figure 
are the average values of total assets for public companies scaled by 
GDP per person. 
Figure 3 presents the average value of total assets for public 
companies scaled, as in Figure 2, by contemporaneous income per person. 
Consistent with the data for the largest existing corporations, these data 
show a dramatic change in the twentieth century. But here the growth is 
even more dramatic, and to present the range of values on a single graph, 
the data are presented in logarithmic scale. Whereas the total assets of 
public companies in the 1820s and 1870s were equivalent to about 13,000 
and 15,000 times income per person, those of 1900 were equivalent to 
more than 300,000 times income per person, and those of 1930 were 
equivalent to 870,000 times income per person. This is again consistent 
with the argument in The Modern Corporation that the quasi-public 
company achieved unprecedented scale in the early twentieth century. 
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We conclude from these data that Berle and Means were correct in 
their characterization of the growing scale of quasi-public corporations 
over time. Compared to their 200 firms in 1930, public companies from 
the nineteenth century were considerably smaller, even if their scale is 
measured relative to income per person. 
C. The Separation of Ownership from Control 
We now turn to one of the most important arguments of The Modern 
Corporation—that ownership separated from control among quasi-public 
companies in the early twentieth century. Berle and Means do not give a 
precise date for this development, but their description of the history of the 
corporation implies that it was relatively recent. I therefore compare the 
degree of separation of ownership from control with those of samples of 
quasi-public companies from historical periods. 
Berle and Means’s conception of the separation of ownership from 
control is not necessarily amenable to precise measurement. Except in 
cases where they found that a legal device was used to maintain control, 
they identified the party or parties in control of an enterprise from the 
distribution of ownership itself; for example, firms whose largest owner 
held more than half of the shares were designated as being under majority 
control, firms whose largest owner held less than half of the shares were 
designated as being under minority control, and firms with no substantial 
owners were designated as under management control.26 The degree of 
separation of ownership from control was inferred from the size of the 
ownership stake of the controlling party: the smaller its size, the greater 
the degree of separation. Although in principle it may be possible to assign 
historical corporations into the Berle and Means categories of control from 
their ownership lists, doing so would introduce some uncertainty into the 
analysis. For example, the surviving records may not reveal whether 
control was held by some legal device. To avoid such questions, I instead 
focus on the degree of ownership concentration as a measure of the 
separation of ownership from control, which is directly comparable across 
samples of companies. 
Berle and Means present other data related to the separation of 
ownership from control as well. For example, they emphasize the 
enormous numbers of shareholders among the largest corporations of their 
time, and also the low degree of managerial ownership. Such data are also 
available for historical companies and will be presented here. 
I begin with an analysis of the total number of shareholders of public 
companies, focusing on the same samples of companies presented above. 
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These data are presented in Figure 4 in logarithmic scale. As with the 
figures displaying the size of corporate assets, the data for corporate 
ownership exhibit a similarly dramatic increase in the early twentieth 
century. 
 
Figure 4: Total Shareholders, Public Corporations (Log Scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the changes in the average total number of 
shareholders among public companies in the United States. The 
average number of shareholders is presented in log scale. For sources 
and methods, see the Appendix. 
 The average number of shareholders increases from less than 200 in 
the 1820s; to around 600 in the 1870s; more than 5,000 in 1900; and 
around 39,000 in the sample of the 200 largest companies in The Modern 
Corporation. The number of shareholders in nineteenth century 
corporations was orders of magnitude smaller than in twentieth century 
corporations, and Berle and Means were correct in their claim that the 
numbers of shareholders among the largest enterprises had grown to 
historically unprecedented levels. 
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But it may not be the case that ownership is separated from control 
when the number of shareholders is large. A large number of shareholders 
necessarily implies that a substantial fraction will hold a small stake in the 
business, which would likely contribute to passivity among the owners. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the shareholders as a group 
have collectively surrendered control of the enterprise when their numbers 
are large. A single owner holding a large block or majority of the stock 
could have been present among the other owners. 
An alternative indication of the structure of ownership is the level of 
ownership held by management. As with the total number of owners, this 
figure does not clearly indicate the degree of separation of ownership from 
control. But it does provide an indication of the extent to which ownership 
and management are separated, which is related to the separation of 
ownership from control. Managerial ownership data are not presented for 
most of the 200 corporations in The Modern Corporation. But they are 
available from 1935 and 1995, from data reported to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. They are also available for the same samples of 
companies presented above, and for the Bank of New York in 1790. 
 
Figure 5: Managerial Ownership, in Percent:  
Large Public Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the level of managerial ownership, computed as 
the percentage of the common stock held in the names of the officers 
and directors, over time. For sources and methods, see the Appendix. 
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The data are presented in Figure 5. In contrast to all the previous 
figures, these data exhibit no significant changes over time. Whereas the 
analysis of Berle and Means generally implies that there should be a 
downward trend, particularly in the twentieth century, no such trend is 
present. The corporations of the 1930s were substantially larger than their 
predecessors and had far greater numbers of shareholders. Yet in terms of 
the fraction of shares owned by management, they looked virtually 
identical to the public companies of the 1870s, or for that matter, to those 
of the 1790s. The data in Figure 5 may suggest that the proportion of shares 
held by the management in large public companies is less a function of 
corporate scale than other factors, which may not have changed much over 
time. 
Finally, I turn to the concentration of ownership itself. The two 
historical contexts for which complete ownership lists are available for a 
substantial number of public companies are the 1825–1826 NYS&EB 
corporations, and the 1872 Boston Stock Exchange Corporations. From 
the complete ownership lists for these companies, I recorded the size of 
the largest block of stock held by any individual or institution. In Table 12 
of The Modern Corporation, Berle and Means report the size of the largest 
block of shares held in many of their 200 companies. In some cases, 
however, they do not have ownership data, but instead indicate that the 
company was controlled by a legal device, was presumably under 
management or minority control, or was in other special circumstances, 
typically receivership. For companies in each of these categories, I assume 
that they had no significant owner. This should bias the data in favor of 
the argument of Berle and Means, showing a greater degree of ownership 
dispersion.  
 
Table 1: Control of American Public Companies Over Time 
 
 
Percent Widely Held: 
10% Cutoff 20% Cutoff
 (1) (2) 
NYS&EB Listed Companies, 1826 52 75 
   
Boston Stock Exch. Mfg. & Utility Companies, 1872 
 
80 98 
Berle and Means 200 Largest, 1930 59 63 
 
This table presents the degree to which public companies in 1826 and 
1872, and the Berle and Means sample of 200 companies from 1930, 
were widely held. “Widely Held” is defined as lacking a substantial 
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owner, where substantial is defined in two ways. Column (1) presents 
the percentage of the firms in each sample that did not have a 10 % 
owner. Column (2) presents the percentage that did not have a 20% 
owner. For information on the sources and methods used in 
constructing the table, see the Appendix. 
Table 1 presents comparisons of the degree to which the 1826, 1872, 
and Berle and Means companies (the 200 largest in 1930) were widely 
held. Following a categorization fairly standard in the corporate finance 
literature, I characterize a company as widely held if it does not have a 
significant owner.27 Two thresholds for a significant owner are used: an 
owner holding 10%, and an owner holding 20%. The numbers in the table 
indicate the percentage of sample companies that are widely held in sense 
that they did not have a 10% owner (column (1)) or a 20% owner (column 
(2)). 
The data in the table completely reject the notion that the 200 
companies analyzed by Berle and Means were more widely held, or had 
less concentrated ownership, than public companies from earlier eras. 
Quite surprisingly, ownership was substantially more concentrated among 
the Berle and Means firms than it was among 1872 Boston Stock 
Exchange firms. And the ownership of the 200 firms was roughly 
comparable (if somewhat more concentrated when a 20% cutoff is used) 
to that of the public companies of 1825–1826. At least within the available 
samples of public companies presented here, there is no evidence at all that 
ownership separated from control in the twentieth century—this was 
already the case among nineteenth century public companies, including 
those of the 1820s. Even though twentieth century firms were much larger 
in scale and had far greater numbers of shareholders, their ownership was 
relatively concentrated, and in fact more concentrated than that of many 
nineteenth century public firms. 
This insight is consistent with the observation made by other scholars 
that the data presented in The Modern Corporation does not provide clear 
support for the notion that ownership was separated from control to a 
significant degree in 1930.28 Only 44% of the 200 firms in Table 13 of the 
book were characterized as under management control, for example. If we 
acknowledge that the ownership of the Berle and Means firms were in fact 
                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471–74 (1999). 
 28. Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 
453 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he evidence on the separation of ownership from control was, though, not 
clear-cut”); Kenneth Lipartito & Yumiko Morii, Rethinking the Separation of Ownership from 
Management in American History, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025, 1038 (2010) (arguing that “more 
recent work tends to show that separation of ownership from control was neither as rapid nor as 
thorough as conventional readings of Berle and Means text assume”). 
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relatively concentrated, then the insight that it was no less concentrated 
than that of historical firms becomes somewhat less surprising. 
The notion that ownership was separated from control among 
nineteenth century public companies is supported by other elements of the 
history of America’s securities markets as well. There have been many 
episodes in which the “divergence of interest” between controlling 
insiders and the outside securities holders of prominent public companies 
led to acute problems for their governance. For example, a frustrated 
investor in some of the manufacturing firms traded on the Boston Stock 
Exchange in the 1860s published a pamphlet, entitled Some of the Usages 
and Abuses in our Manufacturing Companies, in which he argued that the 
firms’ many small shareholders had become entirely passive and had not 
adequately monitored management or participated in the governance of 
those firms.29 As a result, the directors, who themselves held only small 
ownership stakes in their enterprises, engaged in a variety of transactions 
that benefitted themselves at the expense of the other securities holders, 
including self-dealing with their own mercantile partnerships for the 
purchase of raw material inputs or finished outputs; hiring their relatives 
for managerial positions; and paying themselves salaries that were 
excessive as well. The author of the pamphlet also argued that the directors 
sometimes entrenched themselves in their positions by soliciting proxy 
votes from shareholders through duplicitous means. 
Evidence of similar governance problems can be found among 
nineteenth century railroads and among the 1820s corporations whose 
shares were traded on the New York Stock & Exchange Board.30 Although 
one must be cautious about generalizing from these episodes—it is unclear 
whether they reflected problems typical among early public companies, or 
if they were unusual—they do suggest that problems related to the 
separation of ownership from control were at least present throughout 
much of the history of America’s public companies. 
III. DISCUSSION: HISTORY AND THE BERLE AND MEANS CORPORATION 
Some of the data presented in this Article have confirmed major 
elements of the argument posed by The Modern Corporation. The claim 
that quasi-public corporations became much larger over time, and had 
greater numbers of shareholders, has been shown to be correct. The 200 
corporations in the sample of Berle and Means were radically different 
from early or mid-nineteenth century firms in both respects, and although 
they did not actually displace small enterprises in the way that Berle and 
                                                     
 29. AYER, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
 30. See Eric Hilt, History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics, 6 
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 7–8, 11–13 (2014). 
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Means described, they almost certainly did attain a degree of economic 
and political power that was historically unprecedented. 
Yet it does not follow that the ownership of the large corporations of 
the early twentieth century was separated from control to a degree that was 
historically unprecedented. Even though the total number of shareholders 
among early nineteenth century firms was typically in the low hundreds, 
rather than in the hundreds of thousands, there were often no owners of 
substantial blocks of their stock. And twentieth century companies with 
more than a hundred thousand shareholders sometimes had substantial 
blockholders. All else equal, with greater scale one would certainly expect 
to find greater diffusion of ownership. Yet the scale of an enterprise is not 
the only determinant of the structure of ownership, and the data presented 
in this Article have shown that the ownership structure of the relatively 
small public companies from the nineteenth century was relatively similar 
to that of the corporate giants chronicled in The Modern Corporation. 
The American business corporation has undergone a long and 
complex process of evolution: the public companies of the 1930s were 
quite different than those of the 1870s, 1850s, and 1820s in many 
important respects. Despite those differences, the ownership structures of 
public companies from all those eras were relatively similar. Although the 
entrepreneurs who founded those enterprises and the shareholders who 
invested in them operated in different legal, technological, and 
institutional contexts, problems related to the separation of ownership 
from control and conflicts of interest between controlling insiders and 
outside securities holders were always present. There was likely never a 
period in which ownership and control were unified, with major 
corporations either run by owner-managers, or by a small handful of 
owners who delegated management to agents and carefully monitored 
their performance. Berle and Means wrote that the “surrender of control 
over their wealth by investors” in their era “ha[d] effectively broken the 
old property relationships.”31 The property relationships between investors 
and public companies never lived up to the ideal of their characterization 
of the early history. The problems related to the separation of ownership 
from control identified by Berle and Means are likely inseparable from the 
institution of the public company.   
CONCLUSION: THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 
The analysis of The Modern Corporation culminates in the argument 
that the changing role of the corporation in society required the 
development of a new conception of the corporation. It was no longer 
                                                     
 31. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4. 
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merely a legal entity created to facilitate the conduct of business, but it had 
become one of the most formidable institutions in society. Its profits were 
no longer the product of individual initiative, and its owners no longer took 
responsibility for it or participated in its management. Ownership was 
separated from control. And the control of these institutions that held so 
much influence over everyone’s well-being was held by individuals who 
were apparently accountable to no one. 
Although it was written mostly in the 1920s, The Modern 
Corporation was published during the depths of the Great Depression. The 
economic cataclysm of the Great Depression presented fundamental 
challenges to policy makers, and the book’s analysis of what it describes 
as recent developments in the organization of the economy may have been 
perceived as holding insights relevant to the design of a policy response. 
In this way, the book’s characterization of the corporate system as 
something fundamentally new and specific to the 1930s likely added to its 
impact. 
Yet the analysis of this Article has shown that some elements of the 
book’s description of the corporations of the 1930s were also true of the 
public companies of earlier eras. Ownership has likely always been 
separated from control, and the shareholders of corporations in the 1820s 
and the 1870s would have found some of the argument of The Modern 
Corporation familiar. The new concept of the corporation that Berle and 
Means urged scholars to develop, if it ever emerges, should be applied to 
historical corporations, those of their era, and the corporations of today as 
well. 
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Appendix 
FIGURE 1: CORPORATIONS PER MILLION PERSONS 
This figure presents total business corporations at various points in 
time, scaled by total population. Population figures were linearly 
interpolated from the decennial federal census. No comprehensive data 
exists for total corporations in the United States for years prior to the 
Revenue Act of 1916, which created the modern income tax system. 
Instead, total corporations were collected for New York and 
Massachusetts, which collected detailed records of operating corporations 
pursuant to their states’ capital taxes. It should be noted that both 
Massachusetts and New York were states in which unusually large 
numbers of corporations were created, particularly in the early to mid-
nineteenth century. The figure may therefore understate the degree of 
change that occurred in the years following 1900. 
The sources were as follows:  
For New York State: For 1826: collected from the records of New 
York’s comptroller relating to New York State’s 1823 capital tax on 
corporations, New York State Archives, Albany NY. Ledgers of existing 
corporations were found in Record Group A1301 and A1204. For 1868: 
New York Senate, Document 91, April 10, 1868. Report of the 
Comptroller, Giving the Name of All Stock Corporations Doing Business 
in this State, Under General or Special Laws, etc. 
For Massachusetts: Total corporations in the state was collected at 
five-year intervals over the years 1870–1910 from Report of the Tax 
Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. That publication 
includes a count of the total number of corporations operating in the state 
for those years only. The totals do not include national banks, which had 
federal charters, but do include corporations of other states operating in 
Massachusetts. The number of national banks was therefore obtained from 
the Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency and added to the 
total. 
For the United States: Total corporations is reported in the Statistics 
of Income published by the IRS, beginning in 1916. The years 1916 and 
1917 are excluded from the figure, as they include inactive corporations. 
These data are included in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Active Proprietorships, 
Partnerships, and Corporations—Entities, Receipts, and Profit: 1916–
1998 [All Industries]. Table Ch1-18 in Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (Susan B. Carter, 
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard 
Sutch & Gavin Wright eds., 2006). 
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The text states that the rate of use of the corporation in New York in 
the early twentieth century was like that of the United States. Data for total 
business corporations in New York in 1911 was obtained from the 1909 
federal corporate excise tax, published in the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, indicate that there were nearly 33,000 
corporate tax returns filed in New York in that year, implying 3,600 
corporations per million persons in that state, relative to 2,900 for the 
nation as a whole. 
FIGURE 2: SCALE OF THE LARGEST EXISTING CORPORATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: TOTAL ASSETS/GDP PER CAPITA, IN MILLIONS 
This table presents a measure of changes in the scale of the largest 
business corporations existing in the United States at different points in 
time. The measure of their scale is total assets/GDP per person. One way 
to interpret this ratio is: how many persons’ incomes would be required to 
purchase all the assets of the corporations, assuming their incomes were 
the average for the country as a whole. 
Another good measure for this scale would be the fraction of all 
business assets accounted for by the largest corporation’s assets, but no 
reliable or consistent data for total business assets have been compiled for 
the nineteenth century. 
The dates and corporations chosen represent points in time at which 
the largest existing corporation in the United States can be ascertained with 
a reasonable degree of confidence. The period between the closure of the 
Second Bank of the United States (or its successor, the Bank of the United 
States of Pennsylvania), and the publication of Volume 1 of Poor’s 
Manual of Railroads (1868) presents the greatest challenge for the 
historian seeking to identify the largest corporation in existence. The one 
data point selected for this interval (the B&O for 1855) is the most 
uncertain; there may well have been other corporations of greater scale 
during that period. 
The corporations, total assets, and levels of GDP per capita utilized 
in the table are as follows 
 
Date Corporation Total Assets GDP per Capita Ratio 
1801 Bank of the United States 24,040,000  98  245,306  
1831 Second Bank of the United States 112,775,805  86  1,311,347 
1855 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 24,881,415  146  170,421  
1872 Pennsylvania Railroad 90,072,069  222  405,730  
1888 Union Pacific Railroad 240,747,888  225  1,069,991 
1902 U.S. Steel 1,546,544,234 280  5,523,372 
1932 AT&T 4,228,400,000 471  8,977,495 
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The sources utilized for total assets were as follows:  
For the First and Second Banks of the United States: John T. 
Holdsworth & Davis R. Dewey, Nat’l Monetary Comm’n, 61 Cong., 2nd 
Sess. Doc. No. 571. The First and Second Banks of the United States 
(1910) (National Monetary Commission, Washington GPO).  
For the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad: Annual Report of the President 
and Directors to the Stockholders of the Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road 
Company (1855).  
For the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad: 
Poor’s Manual of the Railroads of the United States (1872 and 1888 
volumes).  
For U.S. Steel: Moody’s Manual of Railroads and Corporation 
Securities (1902).  
For AT&T: the data is from Berle & Means, The Modern 
Corporation And Private Property, supra note 1. The value of nominal 
GDP per capita was obtained from table Ca9-19 of Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (Susan 
B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, 
Richard Sutch & Gavin Wright eds., 2006). 
FIGURE 3: SCALE OF PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: TOTAL ASSETS/GDP PER CAPITA, IN MILLIONS 
There are four data points presented in the figure. The last one is for 
1932, and it is the average value of total assets for the 200 largest 
corporations in 1932, as reported in Table 12 of Berle & Means, The 
Modern Corporation And Private Property, supra note 1. The average 
value of those corporations’ total assets was about $410 million, making 
the ratio of that value to GDP per capita equal to about 871,000. 
The next to last is for 1902, and it is total assets (where available) for 
all NYSE-listed corporations. There are no easily accessible 
comprehensive lists of NYSE-listed securities from that era. The listed 
companies are instead obtained from the stock price tables in the New York 
Times. There were 195 NYSE-listed companies at the time. For 146 of 
those, total assets could be found in Moody’s Manual of Corporation 
Securities. The average value of those 146 companies was $90.2 million, 
which was approximately 322,000 times income per person at that time. 
The third data point from the left was for 1872. This is for companies 
traded on the Boston Stock Exchange in that year. There were 130 such 
companies; total assets could be found for 97 of them. The sources were: 
Report of the Tax Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
for the manufacturing companies and utilities chartered by Massachusetts; 
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Annual Report of the Board of Railroad Commissioners of Massachusetts, 
for railroads holding Massachusetts charters; and Poor’s Manual of 
Railroads, for railroads chartered by other states. Total assets averaged 
$3.3 million, which was about 15,000 times income per person in 1872. 
The fourth data point is for 1825–1826. There were about sixty-eight 
New York corporations whose shares were traded on the NYS & EB 
during those years, as indicated in the data of Sylla, Wilson and Wright 
(2005). These corporations consisted principally of insurance companies 
and commercial banks. Paid-in capital for these firms was obtained from 
the records of the New York State comptroller (record group A1301, New 
York State Archives, Albany NY). To convert paid-in capital to assets, the 
relationship between the two was obtained from balance sheets for banks 
and insurance companies from later in the 1820s and from the 1830s. For 
commercial banks, the ratio of assets to paid-in capital was about 3, and 
for insurance companies it was 1.2. Inflating the capital numbers using 
these factors produced an average value of total assets of about $1.1 
million, which was about 13,000 times income per person. 
The value of nominal GDP per capita was obtained from table Ca9-
19 of Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present: Millennial Edition (Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, 
Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch & Gavin Wright 
eds., 2006). 
FIGURE 4: TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS, QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 
For 1791: this is for the Bank of New York, which had 193 
shareholders. The shareholder list is published in Allan Nevins, History of 
the Bank of New York And Trust Company, 1784 to 1934 (1934). 
For 1825–1826: Stockholder lists were found for forty-seven of the 
NYS & EB companies within the New York State Archives. The lists of 
stockholders submitted by the corporations pursuant to the state’s 1823–
1827 tax law were found in various record groups associated with the 
comptroller’s office, including A0833, A0829, and A0847. New York 
State Archives, Albany NY. The average total number of shareholders was 
139. 
For 1872: Complete stockholder lists were found for eighty-one of 
the companies listed on the Boston Stock Exchange, as part of the 
certificates of condition required to be filed annually with the state by 
several classes of business corporations. Microfilm copies of these 
certificates were found in the Massachusetts State Archives. 
Massachusetts railroads submitted a different report to the state’s board of 
railroad commissioners, which did not include a full shareholder list, but 
did report the total number of shareholders. This was found for sixteen 
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Massachusetts railroads listed on the Boston Stock Exchange. For all these 
firms together, the average total number of shareholders was 587. 
For 1900: The total number of shareholders for sixty-eight NYSE-
listed corporations for 1900 (or a year very close to 1900) is reported in H. 
T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United 
States, 39 Q. J. OF ECON. 15 (1924). The average value is 5,034. 
For 1930: The total number of shareholders of the Berle and Means 
sample of the 200 largest corporations is taken from their Table 12. 
FIGURE 5: MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP, IN PERCENT:  
LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES 
For 1791 and 1825–1826: Lists of directors were obtained from 
contemporary sources. These were found for the Bank of New York in 
1791, and for thirty-eight of the NYS & EB companies from 1826–26. 
(See the description of Figure 4 above for sources). The values for those 
years were 11.4% for 1791, and 21.7% for 1826. 
For 1872: The names of the directors of the eighty-one Boston Stock 
Exchange Corporations that had submitted certificates of condition were 
obtained from those certificates and compared to the stockholder lists. The 
average value of managerial ownership was 6.8%. (See the description of 
Figure 4 above for sources). 
For 1935 and 1995: these data are for all NYSE-listed corporations, 
as reported in Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner, & Dennis P. 
Sheehan, Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes In Managerial 
Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression, 54 J. OF FIN. 435 (1999). 
TABLE 1: CONTROL OF AMERICAN PUBLIC COMPANIES OVER TIME 
For the 1825–1826 companies and the 1872 companies, the 
stockholder lists as described in the note on Figure 4 above were searched 
for the largest shareholding and coded accordingly. The Berle and Means 
companies were coded as having a 20% owner if they were indicated as 
being private or if the largest holding reported in Table 12 was 20% or 
greater. 
The one category of firms for which I deviate from the categorization 
of Berle and Means is for companies that had significant owners that were 
themselves widely held. Berle and Means argue that when a blockholder 
was itself widely held, there are no ultimate significant owners of the firm. 
I argue instead that a significant owner, even if itself widely held, would 
have a strong incentive to exercise control. 
 
